0:01
[Music]
0:13
[Music]
0:28
a warm welcome to the technology day of the stockholm security conference and the session on the human mind as a
0:35
battlefield i'm sibila bauer the director of studies for armament and disarmament here at
0:41
cyprie the stockholm international peace research institute and for those of you who are joining for the first time we
0:47
have four dramatic days at this.com security conference yesterday we focused
0:52
on international law tomorrow it will be strategies and doctrines and on thursday we will focus on the protection of
0:59
civilians and we will be concluding the conference with the peace prize ceremony
1:04
in epa belgium which will connect the battlefields of the past with the battlefields of the
1:10
future today we have one more session which will be on current trends in missile
1:15
technology and missile proliferation will be which will be just after this one but now onto the human mind and just
1:23
like the quantum technology sessions earlier today we will now zoom in on one technology
1:28
area and explore implications for current warfare and for future warfare
1:34
and like quantum it's a very complex it's a very fast moving area with many interconnections to different
1:40
technologies and many of us in the arms control community have come across terms like brain hacking neuralink human
1:48
enhancement super soldiers brain computer interfaces some of it we've seen in science fiction movies some of
1:54
it we've heard about in the real world and we're all trying to make sense of it and trying to figure out what's hype
2:00
what are we missing um what of the applications that we think are science fiction are actually real and
2:07
where is it the other way around so we are very lucky to have with us today one of the world's leading experts
2:14
on this issue and i should also say that unfortunately professor knoll had to cancel his
2:20
participation this morning due to unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances but we have with us
2:26
professor jodano who could actually fill all day and actually all week i believe on this topic so there'll be plenty to
2:33
explore in the next hour or so i'll just say a few words about his background so
2:39
he is professor of neurology biochemistry and ethics at georgetown university and also a bioethicist of the
2:47
defense medical ethics center he's a fellow both at the u.s naval academy at the naval war college
2:54
and science advisory fellow of the joint staff at the pentagon and director of the institute for biodefense research
3:01
and has written many books and articles on this subject so i'm sure you'll agree with me that we
3:07
are very lucky to have him with us at this session so
3:12
dr professor jodano will first give an introductory presentation about the state of play current potential future
3:18
military applications and then there will be a chance for you to ask questions
3:24
i would ask you for that to use the q a function and not to use it for statements please only put in questions
3:32
and i will then draw on that pool of questions and put them to gym for the q
3:37
a section but with that now over to you jim thank you very much miss power and so
3:42
again thank you to each and all of you for having me here it's a privilege and an honor to present at this forum and i
3:49
think the title of the forum is very important i mean not just the brain or the mind as the 21st century battlescape
3:55
but also the implications of what current science and technology can do
4:00
the way it may be used the way it most likely will be used and what that infers for stances of
4:07
preparedness readiness and the sustainability for peace particularly given the the very influential role
4:15
that the brain mind will play in a variety of subtle influences in the way we think feel and act
4:22
and perhaps a larger question is what needs to be done in terms of
4:27
multinational engagement guidance and oversight so as to maintain an ethical
4:32
course forward while being very realistic and appreciating the multinational nature of the enterprise
4:39
if we consider neuroscience and technology to be ever more a unified entity colloquially we refer to this as
4:47
neuro snt and the reason for that is quite simple in that there's a relative
4:52
inseparability between the science that is to say the understanding and and
4:58
insights that we gain to the mechanisms of the nervous system in the brain and what that infers for the functions of
5:04
brain most broadly construed to be mind but perhaps more metaphysically if not
5:10
practically construed to be identity self decisions
5:15
feelings and the expression of sane in a variety of interactions from the personal to the
5:21
political but over and above that is that this science has given the ability to assess
5:28
the brain access the brain and affect the brain
5:34
and the science has been capabilized by an increasing tool set a
5:40
toolkit a set of technologies those technologies have allowed us to advance certain theoretical constructs
5:46
about the brain but have also taken us to the limit of our capabilities to assess and affect
5:52
the brain and therefore have prompted the development of new tools
5:58
so what that affords us is the actual capability to harness and engage neuroscience and its technologies
6:06
in what is increasingly become known as integrative scientific convergence
6:12
a relative de-siloing of the physical natural life
6:17
and social sciences in those ways that provide a more three-dimensional understanding of what the brain and its
6:24
functions are and how the brain and its functions can be assessed
6:30
accessed and affected and the nature of those effects and that
6:36
assessment i think most probably is aimed at what i would consider to be the quote low
6:42
hanging fruit in other words much of the driver of contemporary neuroscience and
6:48
technology is aimed at biomedical purposes if you will relatively benevolent ends wanting to do good
6:56
to improve the human condition to reduce the human predicament of disease
7:03
injury and perhaps even the frailties that are a consequence of our finitude and aging
7:09
but please understand to paraphrase the works of the philosopher aleister
7:14
mcintyre we have to ask what good which rationale
7:21
who's justice what we may see whoever the proverbial we are as being a viable good
7:28
can also be seen in certain ways as providing inequities inequalities or in some cases
7:35
frank engagements harms and burdens to others but over and above that understand if we
7:42
can use any science and technology for definable good means
7:47
it really is only a case of how we define good and then whether or not that science and
7:52
technology can be used in a way that is withheld from others to prevent them from accessing those goods and enjoying
7:59
those goods or can be inverted and as a consequence be used to incur
8:05
burdens risks and harms to others so what we can see is that by understanding the brain and its
8:11
processes it gives us the capability of affecting human activities
8:16
on the individual group and perhaps even population levels and these effects can influence a
8:22
variety of postures including postures towards peace postures of vulnerability
8:28
and volatility postures of violence and bellicosity
8:33
and of course i think it becomes critical to understand that like any science and technology throughout human
8:39
history the capability the potential and the allure of using cutting-edge science and
8:45
technology in ways that could be leveraged a variety of competitive engagements
8:51
from the economic all the way to the bellicose is a reality
8:58
so if we consider those ways that these realities are enacted we must understand the existing domains
9:05
in which neuroscience and technologies are employed in what was formerly referred to as nsid
9:12
applications national security intelligence and defense operations
9:18
well there's a bit of a misnomer with that because in some ways it whitewashes the scenario here
9:25
perhaps more appropriate is to understand how neurosciences and their technologies can be employed in warfare
9:32
intelligence and what various collectives view to be agendas and initiatives of national
9:40
security whatever nations they may be here i allude to some of the wonderful
9:46
work i had the privilege and honor of undertaking with my colleagues at the european union human brain
9:51
projects focal group on dual use brain science and a nod of homage to my
9:57
esteemed colleague professor dr katinka evers of university of uppsala in sweden as well as
10:03
many of my colleagues that were participatory in that working group but i think what becomes important to
10:09
understand as a consequence of some of the results of our working group deep dive
10:15
is that the ability to surveil oversee guide and perhaps govern the brain
10:20
sciences is highly contingent upon the understanding that these brain sciences are multinational in their enterprise
10:28
and in their effect and so the discourse must widen and in many cases is dialectic
10:34
please understand at this point in time there are a number of neuroscientific tools and
10:39
technologies that are viable if not already uptaken into warfare intelligence and national
10:46
security operations and agendas nothing i'm about to tell you is science fictional it is all science fact in
10:52
terms of what is currently available or is what at a high technological readiness level
10:58
so as to be made available within the next two to five years how can we use these techniques and
11:04
technology as well again any aspect of medicine and in this case we need to consider military medicine
11:11
but when we're considering military medicine it's not just a question of what we can do to treat those members of
11:17
the military when in fact they are injured or or ill but what can we do
11:24
preventatively here we see a gray zone arising working
11:29
if you will left of bang where bang is some event that induces trauma insult
11:36
injury or change can we work to the left of that can we for example employ the
11:42
neurosciences and technologies in areas of preventative military occupational medicine
11:48
to restore what we may consider to be hope an acronym
11:53
for maintaining health instilling operational and occupational protection
12:00
and enabling these personnel to do their job affect those missions more capably and
12:06
effectively in those ways that will enhance their survivability keep them protected
12:12
and ultimately may also affect the way they interact with competitors or adversaries
12:18
hope hope what are we hoping to do when we consider
12:25
operational and occupational protection and enabling the combat warfighter
12:31
the intelligence operator military personnel of all types to do their jobs better
12:37
well this then gives rise to the idea of what constitutes optimization what constitutes enhancement
12:44
if in fact optimization and enhancement differs from some form of treatment particularly when healthy individuals
12:50
are involved and what are the implications for taking individuals beyond some stated norm
12:57
and is that not on one level or another the implicit if not explicit goal
13:03
of almost any profession's training and certainly military intelligence training to be the best of the best to do those
13:10
jobs well and to do them in a way that provides some advantage
13:15
to one's own forces against other forces whoever they may be
13:21
which gets us back to the idea of what is good if a military
13:27
and or some operational national security institution or organization purports
13:32
to be able to protect the ideology ideals ways of life things
13:37
that are held viable for kin kith the polis or some political agency or
13:44
organization then that's held as a viable good and can be used to justify
13:49
the applications of these types of techniques and technologies perhaps in somewhat more gray zone
13:55
operations the neurosciences can also be paired to intelligence operations to afford increased cognitive capability
14:02
for intelligence operators and systems to be linked to computational systems so as to be able to discern more
14:08
accurately what may be an intelligence viable signal from what may be noise
14:13
whether that's in human intelligence signal intelligence communication intelligence
14:20
and of course the issue there becomes what are we actually doing can we also not only affect the way we perceive and
14:27
gain intelligence but can we use this in a proactive way in other words for psychological or
14:34
what's now referred to as neurocognitive operations ncos to create more viable narratives
14:41
propaganda if you will images to therefore create impressions
14:47
experiences in others that affect them in certain ways that we now have a deeper understanding
14:53
of how we can affect the brain to elicit emotional behavioral and
14:59
perhaps even community and cultural responses and what does that mean on one hand
15:05
certainly i think that the idea the intent and perhaps the hope is that by better understanding the way
15:12
our brains work we'll gain greater insight and appreciation for those things we have in common
15:18
be able to bridge our differences and in so doing facilitate improved communication to avoid the escalation to
15:25
volatility to reduce vulnerability and therefore to avoid violence
15:31
but let's not be pollyannish because the reality is that these tools
15:36
and techniques offer viable and in some cases estimated valuable capability to
15:43
be able to assess and modify the thoughts actions and therefore
15:49
overall stature of others the operational definition if you will
15:54
of a weapon taken from the oxford english dictionary a weapon is simply a means of contending
16:01
against others far more colloquially we see this in bellicose framework in other words the
16:09
means to injure or impair or perhaps kill others but in its strictest definition a weapon
16:16
is some means of influence deterrence and the question then becomes can the
16:22
brain sciences be weaponized in those ways that may be less lethal or non-lethal
16:29
yet their influence be overwhelmingly more powerful in that the effects are getting at the essence of what it means
16:35
to be the relatively enviable space of the self of identity of mind of being able
16:42
to assess and perhaps control thoughts emotions and behaviors remotely and in
16:48
so doing influence postures of individuals groups collectives and perhaps populations
16:55
is there some line that's being crossed there whereby this cognitive liberty is being intruded upon to paraphrase the
17:02
words of my colleague nita farahani at the university of pennsylvania well i think if we understand weapon in
17:09
that context we can then frame the brain sciences into those domains
17:14
and those tools if you will that could be weaponized in such ways generally we
17:20
can parse these into two non-mutually exclusive and interactive domains
17:25
the assessment neurotechnologies which include things like various forms of neuroimaging neurophysiological recording
17:32
neurogenomics neurogenetics epigenetics and phenotypics neuroproteomics
17:37
and the use of neurobig data which when coupled to decision technologies machine
17:42
learning and ai creates an omnibus juggernaut of capability to not only acquire data and
17:49
utilize data but also to manipulate the data itself whereby assessment
17:55
immediately can turn into effect this then brings us into the realm of
18:00
the interventional neuro technologies and perhaps first and foremost if not easiest is the ability to use excellent
18:07
systems of computational technology and engineering together with decision technologies big data acquisition and
18:14
use in various forms of soft to hard ai to manipulate the data
18:20
themselves and by manipulating the data on large scales it may be possible to literally paint
18:26
a new reality of what an individual is to implant information into large-scale
18:32
data banks make individuals appear to have certain neurological or psychiatric conditions
18:38
to affect their capability to do their job by virtue of if you will their profile their data profile by affecting
18:45
aspects of their metadata so that they're regarded and perhaps treated in different ways economically
18:52
socially militarily politically but wait there's more
18:58
the more we know the further we can go and one of the existing concerns is that
19:05
the ubiquity of what's called bio data particularly neurobio data
19:11
creates certain vulnerabilities and target abilities to be able to create precision pathogens
19:17
now those pathogens need not be the traditional drugs bugs or toxins
19:22
they can also be certain devices that can be tuned to individual parameters of
19:28
anthropometry physiology to differentially affect individuals in a variety of ways
19:34
to direct or compromise their capability for thought emotion and action putting all of these together we see a
19:41
new toolkit that essentially engages not only those domains that have been well addressed by
19:48
current language of biological toxins weapons conventions chemical weapons conventions and various declarations of
19:53
signatory treaties but in some ways sidestep that as i hope to show you which may as we've called
20:00
for together with our international colleagues necessitate a revisiting if not revision of the language scope and
20:07
tenor of these existing conventions and treaties new drugs for example that are able to penetrate
20:13
the brain space far more capably at much lower doses for example linking
20:19
pharmaceuticals to nano-engineered scaffolds micelles
20:25
chaperones that allow facile penetrance into the brain space sometimes through means that can be
20:31
rather clandestine or covert inhalation transdermally and doing so with higher
20:37
specificity in fact in some cases targeting these pharmaceuticals to be able to work in
20:43
key individuals or groups of individuals based upon an understanding of their pharmacogenomics and dynamics
20:50
here too we see the ability to generate novel microbiologicals whether that may be bacteria
20:56
fungi viruses and increasingly there is worry about the potential weaponization of
21:01
prions that based upon individual collective and populational information can be
21:07
developed so as to high selectivity affecting key individuals either individually targets of high value
21:15
or more globally more universally creating if you will bellicose value and
21:21
affecting relatively benign and generalizable targets like the general population a conversation you'll have
21:28
later in your conference as well we can utilize various methods of gene editing and synthetic biology to
21:34
develop organic neurotoxins that are far more stable less labile
21:39
more effective and can be used with precision particularly if and when delivered to the variety of unmanned
21:45
vehicles aerial ground or sea based and a variety of technological devices
21:51
that can be used to augment or change cognitive capacity things that can be donned or doffed for
21:56
example transcranial magnetic and electrical stimulation vagal nerve stimulation
22:02
and there is a robust move forward to create implantable devices
22:08
that are non-invasive or minimally invasive in their implantation methods
22:13
so as to create next generation neural modulation that allows real time access
22:18
to read from the living brain and right into the living brain
22:24
remotely such capacity with this ability i think also comes
22:32
necessary in authentic anticipation and in some cases anxieties and apprehensions
22:39
please understand that the neurosciences in the development of neurotechnology is not
22:45
the provence of if you will a given few at present there are multiple
22:51
large-scale national level brain science initiatives that are pouring billions of
22:56
currency units into projects in the brain sciences
23:01
again the most notable direction of these the driver clearly is
23:06
explicit those things that are benevolent wanting to do good reduce the burden of human predicament in disease
23:12
injury capability but that capability curve exists along a spectrum
23:18
and here too the ability to utilize the brain sciences to improve our quality of life
23:24
and or to use the brain sciences in preventive ways immediately allows us to confront again the idea of occupational
23:30
preventive military intelligence medicine super soldiers proverbial super spooks
23:36
for the intelligence operator but recall here too what is my good may
23:42
not necessarily be your good what i and my kin and kiss hold to be
23:47
valuable defensible may not in fact be what yours defines to
23:53
be so and so the use of advancing tools science and technology inclusive of the
23:58
brain and cognitive sciences in those initiatives and agendas that can be used
24:03
in defensive ways or in some cases explicitly offensive ways
24:10
to decapablize others to reduce their will their willingness or perhaps their
24:16
cognitive and physical capabilities to advance towards some level of volatility or violence
24:24
is very very real but more than that what becomes important to understand is that the
24:29
underlying philosophies ethics anthropologies and therefore limitations and constraints on the brain sciences in
24:36
terms of research and their translation into various practices inclusive of those that could be used for military
24:41
medicine and to be used in military warfare intelligence operations differ as a consequence of culture
24:49
we know that large-scale initiatives of the brain sciences are multinational there is an increasing asian effort to
24:55
be sure that is explicit this is advancing developed nations and giving them certain capabilities to
25:01
leverage the brain sciences in and across fusions of governmental initiatives research initiatives and
25:07
commercial initiatives that at the very very least could leverage the brain sciences and
25:12
economic ways to create new balances of power on medical markets and perhaps
25:17
even lifestyle if not military markets as well what we're seeing is a rise in
25:23
what has been colloquially referred to as neuro hacking a do-it-yourself community which not is not problematic per se
25:31
but is certainly vulnerable to influence and manipulation by state actors and non-state actors and the
25:38
development of proxies both state and non-state proxies within the global neuroscience community
25:44
and do-it-yourself community that can be manipulated in those ways to affect sovereign states through the
25:50
infiltration of capabilities within those states jurisdictions difficult if
25:55
you will to monitor for example here in the united states there is a directed program with our federal bureau of
26:00
investigation to work with the do-it-yourself neurohacking community in cooperation with interpol
26:07
so as to maintain the stringency rigor and if you will ethical probity of that community and render them somewhat more
26:14
resistance to infiltration by various actors and agents who may have capricious if not nefarious intent
26:22
but i think it's also important to understand that these different cultures
26:27
different countries bring to the table different histories different needs different values
26:33
different philosophies and very often those histories are long-standing and these philosophies anthropologies and
26:39
values establish distinct ethics and those ethics may be far more permissive
26:46
than we whoever we may be would like and in other cases it affords opportunities
26:51
for things like research tourism can't get it done here go there
26:56
well what does that mean is that ethics dumping or is that simply ethical heterogeneity but clearly what it does
27:02
is it reestablishes the capability for leveraging the brain sciences in ways that can be used in multinational
27:09
relations that range from the economic as i said earlier all the way to the bellicose
27:16
and this is becoming easier much of the neuroscience is shared an international forum and i'm not making
27:22
any proposition to decrease that but i think there is a need for increased responsible conduct of research
27:28
inclusive of its dissemination and sharing to be able to understand what's being shared and how it might be used
27:34
there are a number of tools and methods that are available off the shelf and as i mentioned previously there are dedicated efforts by nations and nations
27:41
and their proxies towards not only developing these capabilities in brain sciences that could be weaponized but
27:47
actually putting them into play as as recent evidence would show case in point such things like nova chuck the use of a
27:53
variety of organic toxins and the still somewhat controversial consideration of the use of various
27:59
types of neurologically directed energies so i think it becomes important to recognize that these things are ready
28:06
for prime time the technological readiness level has been indeed acknowledged and appreciated by a number
28:11
of worldwide groups not only ours working within human brain project world health organization unesco most recently
28:18
nato the national academies here in the united states national research council all of them recognizing the viability
28:25
potential bellicose value and realities of neuroscience and technology as tools in warfare
28:33
intelligence and national security some of the more recent discourse for example by the nuffield council some of
28:39
the work of our group not only with the human brain project but with others have addressed those ways that we might be
28:45
able to surveil and oversee these initiatives and agendas but there is also a sticking point
28:53
if one of the recommendations and i think perhaps a viable recommendation is that the brain sciences shall not be
29:00
uptaken into those agendas explicitly by those countries who would sort of embargo or push back on these intents
29:07
we have to appreciate not only what that does idiosyncratically within a country or community but what are the benefits
29:14
if not burdens risks and perhaps threats systemically because a lack of commitment to
29:20
neuroscientific and technological research development testing does not in any way preclude others
29:27
research development testing and perhaps application and translational use initiatives and in some cases may
29:32
augment it and this gets us to the difficulty of global surety
29:38
conventions helsinki biological toxins and weapons conventions are having a
29:44
difficult time dealing with some of these non-conventional techniques and technologies very often international treaties don't
29:50
necessarily guarantee cooperation but more than that the extant verbiage
29:56
of many of these treaties has only begun to scrape the surface as to the categorical diversity of the
30:03
way these neuroscientific tools and technologies could be developed and used and the btwc and cwc don't explicitly
30:10
prohibit medical use occupational preventive medical use
30:15
commercial or proprietary use in the development of particular tools and technologies that can be employed in
30:21
commercial testing inclusive of commercial testing for example of organic materials to assess
30:28
their vulnerability in the workspace in some cases the research development
30:33
test evaluation and use of neurotechnology this latter point was specifically addressed by the
30:40
australia delegation the australia group at the review conference of the biological toxins and weapons
30:46
conventions a couple of years ago and so this is coming to the fore increasingly and i'm encouraged by that
30:51
but i think what we're really facing here is that neuroscience and technology can be likened to an international super
30:56
speedway a formula one race multiple lanes multiple vehicles a very very high
31:02
technological prowess and capability a rapid pace relatively big prizes again that range
31:08
from the financial all the way to global hegemonies and the ability to influence and exert forces in a variety of
31:15
different domains again from the economic to the bellicose and there are risks and hazards risks and hazards that
31:20
are inherent to the technology and those that are derived from its various uses and military operations
31:26
although very often exists with some level of limited transparency in an open society
31:33
must have some level of responsibility and communication to the public that it vows to protect
31:40
the question then becomes if we're going to enter the race and we already have are there race rules and or restrictions
31:47
well our group working together with others here in the united states and internationally have proposed that if you're going to get on the racetrack you
31:54
need some rules to get on the ramp we've proposed something called the on-ramp approach an operational neurotechnology
32:02
risk assessment and mitigation paradigm and i provide those references for you writ large in overview it involves a
32:09
general 6r approach that then drills down into specific questions that must be asked and key context of framing that
32:16
must be appreciated it demands responsibility for realistic assessment of the technology not science
32:23
fiction there are plenty of real things that need to be addressed reviewed and in some cases guided
32:29
evaluating research as viable uses in practice what constitutes dual use research of concern what does not what
32:36
constitutes gain of function research a concern and what does not responsive to the burdens and effects
32:43
not only idiosyncratically among individuals and collectives but perhaps systemically as well
32:49
given certain harms of omission or commission revising that technology in response to
32:55
those risks that may be relatively intractable or relatively unpreventable in this case advancing something of an
33:01
advanced precautionary principle but not just going beyond that making sure that those revisions are
33:07
also regulatory within the framework of these key questions because what we see is that very often
33:12
the ethics that are important to guiding these transcend simple civilian ethics or
33:18
perhaps even science and technological ethics and interface with the ethics of power
33:24
the ethics of competition the underlying issue here is that these types of scientific and technological
33:30
developments that have such capability to affect thought emotion and behavior are certainly being considered for and
33:37
uptaken within initiatives and agendas of warfare intelligence and national security
33:43
and very often being done to the drumbeat of their powerful capability that are exercised to preserve what a
33:50
politics or polis may be those communal values ways of life and exercising power to do that
33:57
and if one considers that the explicit mission of a military or intelligence operation is to protect the ideals
34:04
objectives and integrity of the state whether that state is an open society whereby politics is there to protect the
34:10
polis or a politically referential state in which case the ideals directions and
34:16
power of the state supersede any and all else it prompts real questions discourses and
34:23
i believe dialectics of relative good and it has to begin to refer to those constructs of what represents
34:30
just use of various techniques and technologies in warfare and perhaps even what represents just
34:36
use of techniques and technologies to prevent warfare
34:42
it must pose the question who is harmed who is not and are there
34:49
certain aspects of these neurosciences and technologies that are indeed malum in say bad unto themselves and therefore
34:57
should be arrested or restricted i can tell you from my own experience working with the human brain project
35:03
working with nato working with world health organization and others that although it only took me perhaps 30 minutes to talk about this the actual
35:09
enterprise itself is laborious any approach to surveillance oversight
35:16
ethics and regulatory guidance must be cosmopolitan as cognizants recognize these different values that exist within
35:22
cultures and communities and nations and what that means with regard to various power balances that can be affected using the brain sciences but it also has
35:29
to be capable within communities of use medical communities social communities etc it needs to at least appreciate if not
35:36
accommodate pluralist values but not necessarily be a lazy for a fair form of ethics
35:41
and it must also appreciate how the brain sciences and their technologies are affected by and affect
35:47
economics politics military intelligence capability and in
35:52
the balance power working with many of my colleagues again professor dr katinka evers my colleague
35:59
john shook my colleague diane deulas my colleague professor dr nicola coles internationally what we've tried to do
36:05
is appreciate what type of an ethical approach what type of neuroethical approach may have some viability in this
36:11
forum working with my well-known colleague dr jonathan moreno and our mutual colleague
36:17
michael tennyson we've examined what this sort of ethics for pandora might actually obtain and
36:23
entail i only have a bit of your time here today and i hope that my presentation has allowed you to be informed about the
36:30
realities of neuroscience and technology and what it's capable of doing what the real capabilities and
36:35
limitations of the technology are and how very often those limitations provide nothing more than throwing an opportunistic gauntlet
36:42
of what could be done next and the power that the brain sciences yield
36:47
so the real question is in caching the reality check of our perspective relative humility and perhaps our
36:54
gratitude to the systems that we have in place and the capability to at this point remain prepared and ready for what
36:59
shall come what comes next
37:05
well i think we need to cash the reality check and understanding neurobioeconomic savvity saving in our group together
37:10
with others has written quite a bit about this and i refer you to that in a recent volume of the journal health
37:16
security that addressed the bioeconomy at large and the neurobioeconomy more specifically the factors that can be
37:23
leveraged in what we call non-kinetic engagements of warfare and economics by which power can be exercised utilizing
37:30
brain tech just within the medical domain considerable if we then take that domain over to
37:36
advances and capabilities of power within intelligence and military it becomes ever more the juggernaut
37:42
this necessitates some appreciation if not development of biosecurity by design inclusive of perhaps revisiting and
37:49
revising key aspects of international conventions and signatory treaties to be more inclusive and remain a pace with
37:55
the capabilities of that science and ultimately if what we're going to try to do is create discourse
38:01
and do so in a way that is reflective perhaps in a if not rawsian reflective way and we're going to do
38:07
this in a way that maintains some ethical high ground so that ethics can inform policy and law
38:12
law and policy try to uphold those ethics we have to appreciate a globally relevant neuroethics because the
38:19
capabilities that a variety of nations have leveraged in the brain sciences has brought them to those discussion paper
38:25
tables as key players and so i offer this to you not necessarily to provide answers but to
38:30
pose key questions in the spirit of the philosopher of science bruno latour science doesn't just answer questions it
38:37
creates questions that are ever more difficult that prompt our engagement on a variety of levels in both the sciences
38:44
and humanities to address reasonable solutions or at least trajectories to be prepared ready and perhaps resolve those
38:51
questions that are generated if you're interested in the information that my group has done over the past several years i provide you these
38:58
additional readings and if you're interested in getting in touch with me after today's lecture in conference
39:04
beyond the question and answer period i provide you my point of contact simply put in the subject line stockholm
39:09
conference and i'll get back to you promptly and you can reach me at james.jordano at yourtown.edu once again
39:16
james.giordano at georgetown.edu and with that i thank you for your time and we'll open up the
39:22
floor for questions answers and discussions
39:28
you so much that was a fascinating scary and mind-boggling at the same time and
39:34
as he said you raised many as many questions or more questions than you answered there's so much to explore and
39:41
before i raise some of the questions that were put by the audience i wanted
39:47
to follow up with some questions that i had myself so it became quite clear in the earlier
39:54
session already we had on quantum that there is a huge need for
39:59
think tankers and the policy world to educate ourselves about these technologies
40:06
how would you advise policymakers to take this forward in terms of priorities
40:12
because there's a bundle of different technologies what is current and immediate and urgent what is near-term
40:19
what is sort of more long-term into the future and then link to that what kind of governance mechanisms are
40:27
feasible so you're touched upon some of those that exist do they need to be adjusted the chemical
40:32
weapons convention the bioelectrical weapons convention um you also mentioned some things maybe
40:37
so bad they need to be restricted so there should there be some things that could be bad and that could be banned
40:44
you also talked about expo controls how could they come in so it would be great if you phrased some very complete
40:51
advice to policy makers where this is a very exotic area also in the arms control community where should they
40:58
focus their efforts yeah so let me address the first part because it's far easier because once we
41:04
get into policy particularly multinational policy discourse things become far more complex
41:10
tricky and nuanced for a variety of reasons we'll talk about that as well in terms of what things are on the
41:16
horizon of reality and possibility it becomes critical to appreciate what those horizons are
41:22
what we understand is the horizon can be parsed into three interactive domains the past five years to the next five
41:29
years represents the vista or the horizon of probability those are the scientific and
41:34
technological developments that are most probably being realized and are at a high technological readiness level for
41:40
application of practical uses inclusive for example of weaponization intelligence warfare and national
41:46
security once we achieve those probabilities and those have been realized it allows us
41:52
some insight to the next vista which is six to 15 years in the future which is considered to be the horizon of
41:59
possibility in other words it's a relative given
42:04
realization of certain probabilities in their actualization a number of possibilities become
42:10
available become viable become tenable and achievable and these two windows if you will the
42:16
probable and the possible are capable of being effectively modeled and if you will gained war games red
42:24
white and blue team to be able to create and construct scenarios of possibility because the time framework is such that
42:31
multivariate analysis is still possible without the broad range of we call fractal effects or diffusional effects
42:38
across a variety of domains and dimensions of society structure politics world effects
42:44
once we get beyond 15 to 20 years we get into something known as the vista or
42:49
horizon of potentiality and what will happen as things go forward is the diversification of uses
42:56
applications and potential misuses of science and technology increase
43:02
and the relative capability to predict and accurately speculate if not forecast
43:08
those uses and their implications decrease this has then been synergized by the
43:14
current pace of neuroscience and technological advancement which has been compressed from about a 15-year window
43:21
down to about five calendar years and if we take at face value
43:27
the claims of the china brain project this has been compressed even further so
43:32
that there is a move from concept to true working construct of a method or
43:38
a tool within 40 calendar months it's a very very rapid pace and amongst that rapid pace you'll also see a
43:44
diversity of foci and applications so the first step is to remain a pace with the actual capabilities of the
43:51
science worldwide that requires some level of informational exchange some level of
43:57
oversight and to some extent some level of professional surveillance
44:02
surveillance gets to be problematic because in some cases such surveillance is prevented if not inhibited in part by
44:10
what's called commercial veiling there are a number of nations in which there is a relatively seamless triple
44:15
helix of government inclusive military the research enterprise university
44:21
research enterprise private research enterprise and the commercial sector
44:26
and by feeding things into the commercial sector they then become the province of intellectual property laws
44:32
which are therefore protected by proprietary interests and can be commercially veiled
44:37
making deep surveillance somewhat problematic not impossible but problematic here too one of the
44:42
revisitations needs to be on the scope and tenor of such intellectual property laws to be able to allow certain levels
44:48
of transparency into those domains of any science and technology brain science and technology in this case more
44:54
particularly to be overseen to gain certain insight to have relative transparencies and not
45:01
in ways that would necessarily violate intellectual property or proprietary claims here too it's a question of if
45:07
you will co-op petition maintaining a level of cooperation while at the same time appreciating that said
45:13
cooperation may be fostered or occur within a relative atmosphere of competition and that competition
45:19
may be economic or may in fact be somewhat more nefarious appreciating the reality of that
45:25
situation is important which then brings us to the next point how then do we approach the oversight
45:31
and then change to guidance and governance one of the things i'm very proud of is that working
45:38
together with my colleagues at king's college at university of uppsala and part of the human brain project special
45:43
task force on dual use is we didn't just plot out those relative time frames and where various
45:49
types of technologies would fall out in their technological readiness realization but also what those trajectories for
45:56
progress would impart incur and necessitate in terms of proactive
46:02
discussions within those guidance and governing bodies that oversee various
46:07
forms of brain science and this is where it does get a bit difficult and i'll refer the audience
46:13
here to some of the experiences i had working with the organization for economic cooperation and development
46:19
when you bring multinational groups to the table there needs to be an appreciation that there is at very very
46:27
economic sort of national centrist orientation in terms of how do these various developments
46:34
comport for viable national strategy and tactical effect on the economic stage in other words what benefit does it regard
46:41
to not only our people but also our markets our economics and
46:47
as we noted the brain sciences are affording considerable capability within developed
46:53
countries but are also creating new dependency relationships between developed countries developing and even non-developed countries
47:00
and the existing histories of various nations that are engaged in these endeavors
47:05
also allow them to bring forth their concomitant philosophies and various ethics that may then be
47:13
differentially constrictive or permissive and to be able to claim there is a
47:18
universal ethic even perhaps claiming that there is some universal capability
47:23
or or respect for the human person is countered very often by yes there may
47:29
be respect for the human person but we define the human person differently we define human dignity differently
47:36
our culture is more of a collective rather than one that is sort of a liberal or individualistic culture
47:41
our culture is more generational rather than short-termed and and temporal and as a consequence all of these factors
47:48
need to be capabilized and need to be incorporated into an authentic realistic
47:54
and genuine approach not only to the ethics that may give rise to certain permissivities or constraints in
48:00
research and translation but what that means for guidance and governance which then brings us to these types of
48:06
conventions to say what would be a viable approach i mean i only have a few minutes and it
48:11
was an excellent question and i'd be happy to entertain this question some more deeply we've published some work together with our international
48:16
colleagues on proposed methods or more a methodology a logical accounting of
48:22
different methods as to which might be more useful we've advocated for example some form of
48:28
balanced equilibrium a guardian type of equilibrium versus a simple rawlsian equilibrium easy to say not easy to do
48:36
we've also based upon some type of what's called resharian analysis of utilizing versus
48:42
current predictive proactive forms of ethical and guidance discourse in terms
48:48
of what could happen based upon effective modeling empirical modeling and you also have to appreciate the
48:53
variables that are often referred to as mini max or maximin maximum benefit with minimum risk or providing maximum
48:59
capability to those who have minimum access so all of this folds into some sort of quasi calculus if you will of
49:06
what needs to be part of the process but like anything else the process is a human process and that human process
49:14
involves people purpose some proceedings and ultimately what's
49:19
going to come out of that is some form of power capabilization and the relative at least sustainment of individuals
49:27
comfort with that level of power that is conferred or not confirmed in looking at harms of omission not doing certain
49:32
things or harms of commission relatively easy to say
49:37
not easy to do but again i am somewhat enthused in that these discussions have advanced on the world
49:44
stage to be more inclusive and more appreciative of these cosmopolitan orientations towards an attempt to
49:50
create a more viable and genuine both ethical approach and how that ethical approach can then inform if not directly
49:58
enthuse viable policy
50:04
many things i'll put two more questions then i'll come to the questions that were posed one
50:10
comes from the opening panel of the ssc where one of the panelists raised the
50:15
question how does power play out what does power mean for the specific
50:20
technology so what does power mean for neuroscience and the other one you've touched upon a number of other
50:26
technologies and one of the interesting questions are the interconnections between technologies you've mentioned
50:32
biotechnology in particular function cyber ai you refer to machine learning
50:37
and robotics which ones are the most
50:43
potentially powerful risky interconnections uh
50:49
as regards the first with regard to power equilibria and the capabilities that are leveraged by the brain sciences
50:56
let me let me sort of reduce it down if you will to some common common capabilities
51:02
what the brain sciences afford us the ability to do is to assess and gain information from
51:09
the living brain in both individuals and groups interpret that information in ways that
51:16
have meaning very often we ascribe the meaning as to what these technologies are telling us but then we use that information we use
51:22
that information two ways we use that information itself that we call neurobio data in other words the
51:29
more i know the more i can gain insights to the way your brain works the way your brain
51:35
functions or dysfunctions where your relative strengths are where your relative limitations are and then being able to accommodate or at
51:42
least access those different capabilities strains limitations on an individual or collected basis
51:48
but humans are tool users i mean this is part of our natural history yeah we may call ourselves homo sapiens
51:55
but the reality is that we are homo sapiens technicus we've risen to the relative top of the
52:00
evolutionary ziggurat by virtue of our not only evolutionary capabilities biologically but to augment that biology
52:07
through the use of tools inclusive of those tools that we use to interact with each other cooperatively and competitively brain
52:13
sciences are no different the ability to affect brain structure and function
52:19
allows inciting capability a variety of scales from the subcellular all the way
52:25
to the socio-political from the personal all the way to the political military
52:31
power there's great power in doing that the power of control the power of assessment
52:38
the power of insight and so what we really see is that the brain
52:43
sciences afford us the capability to leverage power on an intimate level
52:48
that also raises the capability of power on an almost infinite level because as we link the brain sciences to
52:55
other forms of what we'll call influence technologies very often previously referred to as
53:01
disruptive technologies and you mentioned a couple computational systems narratives ubiquity of information
53:07
artificial intelligence decision technologies the capability to affect individuals
53:12
cognitions emotions and behaviors via various images narratives and
53:18
presentations that we know to be salient therefore meaningful and effective as well as perhaps more direct ways
53:26
of the use of various if you build drugs bugs toxins and devices
53:32
becomes a rather large tool kit and a very powerful one at that
53:40
now what does that then mean in terms of these various technologies
53:46
i guess buried within that question is sort of the implicit okay what keeps me up at night
53:52
um you know convergent sciences are very important to address key questions where
53:58
the limitations of one discipline are approached by another it affords if you will it's called fresh eyes on the target fresh eyes on the
54:05
task but i think one of the things that happens there too is that the capabilities
54:10
of different disciplines allow for a multi-capability expression
54:15
and reality of what the brain sciences could achieve so what we're able to do is we essentially use neuro or some
54:21
other technological prefix or suffix and we put them together neurocyber cyber neuro
54:26
neural microbiology neuro anthropology where the neuro really is used as synecdoche in other words a
54:33
representation of what our capabilities and our limitations in brain science and technology are
54:39
and when you pair these they essentially work as force multipliers where essentially one hand
54:44
is washing the other and they're both engaged in some tasks what gives me most pause
54:51
uh i'm particularly worried about gene editing techniques and gene editing techniques particularly when coupled to
54:57
synthetic biology because gene editing techniques when coupled to synthetic biology particularly in applied neurocognitive
55:03
dimensions offer unique capabilities to be able to affect the structure and function of the nervous system those
55:08
organisms that have a nervous system in a variety of ways sometimes rather subtly and other times far more severely
55:16
i'm equally worried about the pairing of neural systems with computational systems
55:22
so what we're really seeing is the reciprocal augmentation of the human operator
55:28
and the increasing capabilization of the machine component so you're really getting a truly
55:34
cybernetic organismal system where you're having dual cooperativity
55:40
reciprocity and therefore you're delimiting aspects of both systems
55:45
the issue there is at some point you will get a relative functional fusion
55:50
of human cognitive capabilities with that of the machine and the capability of the machine to
55:57
human cognitive capabilities inclusive of insight to human emotionality
56:02
intentionality impulse and response which can then be engaged
56:08
if we take humans either on the loop or out of the loop to have considerable effect on the way a
56:15
non-biological system that may be cognitive in its capacity and ai system
56:20
affects the dynamics of human individuals and populations and i
56:25
must tell you although we in the united states europe and many of our international
56:31
co-operators are very concerned about keeping proverbial human in the loop or at least on the loop
56:37
such considerations for humans in and on the loop are not universal in some cases artificially intelligent systems that
56:44
are devoid of any human engagement beyond the original builder's bias
56:50
seem to be favored and de-rigged because they're viewed as not necessarily being
56:56
purlined by human influence but being somewhat more and i'm using the language that has been bantered pure
57:02
and that then becomes a consideration of how the brain sciences will need to interface with the information sciences
57:08
in those ways that are going to be proactive great many thanks so one of the audience
57:15
question is about that's a china question the pla talk of the cognitive
57:21
domain of warfare what impact can western ethical restrictions have when opponents have fear restrictions as
57:27
their panelists put it at the audience yeah that's that's an absolutely wonderful question and and i
57:33
think the question is really one of developing discourse and iteratively dialectical synthesis let me explain
57:40
what i mean by that um our chinese colleagues and i use the word in a complementary sense and in the
57:46
most accurate sense they're in league with these enterprises as are we have defined various goods various
57:53
rights and wrongs within their research conduct and its expression into translation that in some cases do not
57:59
comport with long-standing post-enlightenment or classical philosophical and ethical values of what
58:04
was previously referred to as quote the west and i i don't mean to be derogatory in that phrase
58:09
so the question here becomes not only to try to develop a more synthetic approach in other words where the actual thesis
58:16
of what are we using these things for to what ends and are the means and the ends relatively aligned with ethically
58:23
probitious standards norms guidelines and practices but it's also one of becoming syncretic
58:29
and let me explain in other words there may be different belief systems that are involved
58:35
and so one of the approaches that has been advocated to be viable is the one that i alluded to earlier in
58:42
other words coopetation the ability to engage discourse and dialectic to come to a point where there
58:48
is cooperation on certain fronts so as to maintain key domains of competition but those competition
58:55
domains remain somewhat mutually involved so there are key dependencies that must be upheld whereby
59:01
the rising tide both ethical rising tide as well as scientific and technological
59:07
rising tide is important to create relative advantages and at the same time create relative power by dynamics where
59:14
those hegemonies and leveraging domains are decided upon are agreed upon and there's some
59:20
consensus the problem with that of course is that it appreciates
59:28
or priori appreciates that there may be key power players so in other words uh
59:34
the european union the united states australia japan and fill in the blank china and russia
59:41
whatever and what tends to happen is that other players if you will other participants
59:47
or non-participants tend to fall off the slope of that building ziggurat of capability
59:54
so in each and all of those discussions it also becomes important to examine and address whether or not the
1:00:00
science and technology that is being developed by the key power players for the influential if you will power
1:00:05
dynamics of europe united states australia china
1:00:10
how that's going to also incur particular systemic benefits burdens risks and harms more broadly in
1:00:17
what that will do to the global stage picture moving forward that's part of the unesco task force and
1:00:23
certainly that was one of the key domains that was examined by the cognitive warfare report that was
1:00:28
recently developed with nato and again it it needs to be a work in progress i don't have an answer for that but i can
1:00:34
certainly pose the considerations that will be important to its address so i apologize if i didn't answer the question
1:00:40
but at least i hope to have clarified the key domains in the question that are going to be important for its approach
1:00:47
great many thanks so the next question is about non-state actors referring to the fact that the technologies that you
1:00:53
described are more developed by states the um the question oscar said but
1:00:59
actually you also refer to a lot of developments that are not happening by states it would be interesting if you actually differentiated out what kind of
1:01:07
innovation happens in the private sector and academia to what extent is that actually within state ownership and to
1:01:13
what extent are there is that non-state actors in the amount of time allotted here i
1:01:19
mean i think that the entirety of looking at the neural bio economy writ large in other words what what is
1:01:25
the nature of the field in terms of those domains that are state versus non-state those that are state with
1:01:31
regard to governmental and those that regard the free research enterprise and those that are in the commercial sector
1:01:36
versus the do-it-yourself enterprise that's quite a discourse um a very interesting discourse and one that i'd
1:01:42
be happy to undertake with with the questioner independently of this form but to to answer the question generally
1:01:50
i think you see considerable issues where once again the factors of the triple helix in other words government
1:01:57
agenda whether that's politics and or politics in the military have a seamless connectivity if not
1:02:03
guidance and direction of the academic and or private research sector which are then seamlessly connected to
1:02:10
the commercial sector which provides both the opportunity of some veiling through proprietary interest and
1:02:15
intellectual property law and also the ability to develop commercial enterprises that can then
1:02:21
shield the various uses of these techniques and technologies in ways that would not only be commercially industrially destructive
1:02:28
or influential but could certainly be rendered against individuals using various forms of neuroscience
1:02:34
neurotechnologies various forms of directable energies various forms of chemicals development
1:02:40
of various nanomaterials to assess their effect upon inorganic and organic substances for occupational safety and
1:02:47
health can certainly be uptaken into warfare intelligence and national security agendas like that
1:02:54
and if and when those infrastructures of a nation are indeed relatively seamless
1:03:00
and fluid the incorporation into what may then be these agendas of national security
1:03:05
intelligence and defense are facile in other governmental structures where
1:03:11
there is a relative separation between the governmental initiatives that may fund certain areas of brain science
1:03:17
the research enterprise sometimes that is not necessarily aligned or in consensus with certain governmental
1:03:23
possibilities of use and a freestanding and independent commercial enterprise create relative
1:03:29
fractures and in each one of those silos there may be developments that could be
1:03:34
promising and or public problematic so what we're really seeing is in the gross balance of how we need to assess
1:03:41
this field we can see two generalized domains those nation states that have a
1:03:47
relatively seamless infrastructure and its functions of those primary three elements of government research in the
1:03:52
commercial industrial sector and those that although are interactive are not as fluid not as facile and
1:03:59
therefore allow capability of what i would call silo development of things that are promising or problematic
1:04:06
where things get to be somewhat more difficult is how independent actors are sustained
1:04:13
and function within these two different environments understand that characteristically and
1:04:18
please uh let me let me also provide a caveat here and in full transparency i'm not a political scientist
1:04:25
so i don't want to get outside of my sandbox my orientation and my address of
1:04:30
this topic is focal and only vocal to my personal experience and and our addition in those areas that have
1:04:36
been germane to neuroscience and technological development within the socio-political arenas right
1:04:41
higher level of speculation higher level of address of these politically and sociologically relevant variables way
1:04:47
beyond the capability of this simple neuroscientist but one of the things that became very
1:04:53
evident is that in a country in which there is this relative seamlessness between those entities
1:04:59
everything is top down and everything from the bottom up feeds into the
1:05:04
governmental impetus initiatives and agendas so basically it is a collectivist mindset inclusive
1:05:12
of the establishment and perhaps sustainability and flourishing of a do-it-yourself community within that
1:05:18
community it is in fact part of the collective and very often can be funded and supported in those ways
1:05:24
in contrast in those other governmental international systems in which they exist in silos of government research
1:05:31
enterprise and commercial industrial enterprise very often the do-it-yourselfer is seen as somewhat
1:05:37
distinct not necessarily anathema but certainly distinct in that they're operating outside of those relative
1:05:43
silos of oversight or governance and although they may interface with institutional review boards etc the
1:05:50
relative independence and some of the fractional independence of the do-it-yourselfer has different latitudes
1:05:56
in this environment where there is a non-seamless triple helix versus this environment which is
1:06:01
certainly politically and governmentally collective so in looking at the do-it-yourselfer it
1:06:07
also becomes important to understand is the do-it-yourselfer whether the individual or a community of
1:06:12
do-it-yourselfers a means by which those nations that do have political
1:06:18
control over all entities inclusive of the do-it-yourself community can exercise subtle or explicit capability
1:06:25
and control within those nations and frameworks that do not and that's one of the area that is being
1:06:31
explored right now in neurotechnological politics and sociology so i hope that i
1:06:36
address the question to some extent and say to the the the questioner's insights
1:06:42
great thanks then over to confidence building measures and transparency measures so the question about whether
1:06:49
those could help mitigate the security risks and if so which cbmc would suggest and the second one takes us back to the
1:06:55
governance question if it was possible to impose legal restrictions do you think there could be
1:07:01
effective verification you know here i here i refer back to some of the stellar work of my colleague
1:07:07
professor rose at king's college working deeply in the area of of
1:07:14
governance oversight uh and regulatory control he has been a steady and a stalwart
1:07:20
voice on the international stage and certainly was critically important some of the ongoing work in that exact question of
1:07:27
the human brain project not only in europe but also some of the considerations for the various ways that
1:07:33
neurotechnologies can should or should not be utilized or controlled elsewhere in the united states
1:07:39
the idea that there may be different frameworks for oversight and regulation uh participatory science framework
1:07:44
collective science frameworks those that involve sort of key communities of scientific enterprise that can then be
1:07:51
conjoined to each other where you literally have if you will nodes of scientific engagement that can then link
1:07:57
by virtue of edges and networks to other nodes and by virtue of that you can get key areas of dissonance and consonants
1:08:04
in terms of what types of oversight regulation and restriction need to be put in place he's done a wonderful job in articulating i steal not his thunder
1:08:11
or his fire it is impressive in its body of work and its result and i refer each and all the participants to read that
1:08:18
part of the foresight report that was precipitative and then led to our conclusion report the human brain
1:08:24
project and his ongoing work addresses this but to sort of cut to the chase
1:08:30
uh a bit i think that the the the questioner's inquiry here
1:08:36
is well what what is owed in terms of transparencies as well
1:08:42
and this gets to be a relative sticky wicket if you will this gets to be a little bit of a thorny issue
1:08:49
because as soon as we begin to talk about the use of any science and technology for initiatives of national
1:08:55
intelligence security and defense irrespective of whatever nation it is we're talking about
1:09:01
there are those things that various nations will deem as essential to national security and
1:09:07
perhaps public safety on a variety of levels from the domestic to the international
1:09:13
that are not held in full transparency that are classified information
1:09:18
and the nature of that classified information is that it is felt to be best in the common interest
1:09:24
of the polis or in some cases in a closed society for the body politic
1:09:30
the running adage is you know you don't show the other team your playbook
1:09:36
on friday and still expect to win the rugby match on saturday but what if you could
1:09:43
what if you're able to develop a common set if you will of rules and plays
1:09:49
and define certain things as relative in say that at very very least need to be
1:09:55
addressed and reported and in some cases also having a level of
1:10:00
transparency in terms of purpose but not necessarily process why
1:10:05
in an open society in a liberal democracy in an open as an open viable
1:10:11
democratic society such level of transparency is important to be able to engage public discourse
1:10:19
and it also becomes important to inform the public as to what is real and what is not so as
1:10:25
to not miscommunicate or misfoster various expectations anticipations fears
1:10:30
and anxieties it's also a question of saying what's going on if you will out there
1:10:36
and what things need to be done back here to at very very least be prepared
1:10:42
if not ready for what may be those burdens risks and threats we've proposed
1:10:48
a four thrust approach that involves a relative whole of nation orientation that involves number one
1:10:54
awareness of the reality of what the science and technology can do and who's doing it on the world stage
1:11:00
number two quantifying the actual burden risk and threat not all of this stuff is at a
1:11:06
high risk or threat level not all of it is operationally ready in terms of its scalability field ability
1:11:13
certain things are far more low-hanging fruit and far more dangerous than others and those need to be quantified and
1:11:18
that's where the foci should lie and then at that point engaging in the discourse and dialectic
1:11:24
necessary to mitigate those burdens risks and threats at least to a point that arrests relative
1:11:31
brinksmanship and there may in fact be some common dialogue that is necessary as we
1:11:37
recognize and co-model what these trajectories are particularly when we anticipate
1:11:43
in some cases speculate and forecast what might be called runaway effects where the technology runs away from us
1:11:49
either because of the science and technology itself or because of its social draw either within political
1:11:54
military or even just public domains as well as perhaps unanticipated effects
1:12:00
which sometimes are referred to as vexelblot effects in other words if you're doing something that is new
1:12:05
or you're using an existing set of tools and techniques that are novel you have to be able to anticipate that
1:12:12
there will be things that happen that you simply didn't anticipate are you fast are you prepared
1:12:19
this is what we've referred to as footfall effects not so much to impede forward progress
1:12:27
but to be very very aware of where each foot of progress falls
1:12:34
so as to be able to maintain relative balance and equilibrium of those forces
1:12:39
that are and could act as imbalancing measures with each step forward
1:12:48
thank you so much so we've actually been able to spend an hour 15 and we haven't even scratched
1:12:55
the surface of this i have the impression and it's really an extremely complex issue and uh
1:13:01
i'm glad that at cp will be able to take forward this theme of battlefields of
1:13:07
the future and also this particular theme of neuroscience and develop it further so there will be further events
1:13:14
coming up not in the context of this ssc but in the context of future sscs stockholm security conferences and also
1:13:20
events leading up to that so watch this space for those of you who are interested in that um i've also been
1:13:26
taking particular note on the international human authoritarian law and international law angle which we
1:13:32
were not able to explore so we will leave that for for a future follow-up session and
1:13:38
and it's been very interesting also how this has highlighted how important it is to bring together not just natural
1:13:44
science world and the social science world but the academic academic world and the policy world there's so much to
1:13:51
explore and the knowledge is still very insufficient on this issue in the same time community in the politic community
1:13:57
so anything that we can do going forward um to to make this happen i think will
1:14:03
be very important including also to involve industry and one point that was also made at the earlier session is
1:14:08
about the importance of responsible innovation and research ethics really educating um
1:14:16
students from a young age about these issues and potential security risks because it seems like this is
1:14:22
not done sufficiently at universities across the world so if this is something that we can highlight and also bring
1:14:29
next generation natural scientists into this arms control community of the social sciences and bridge these gaps
1:14:35
then i think we can move things forward and maybe 10 15 years down the road we will have a
1:14:41
neurological weapons treaty who knows or there may be negotiations and it definitely sounds like there is a need
1:14:47
at least for a debate and a discussion on that so with that um very big thanks to you professor
1:14:54
for having taken the time um to explain these issues to us and uh we look
1:14:59
forward to further engagement on this thank you also to the sippy tag team and thank you to the audience for
1:15:06
being interested in this very exotic but very very important issue of the human
1:15:12
mind as a battlefield thank you very much
1:15:26
you